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Defendant-Appellant Martineau respectfully submits this
Reply Brief in response to the Brief of Nupetco Associates.
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENTS OF FACTS
1.

The debt which is the subject matter of this action was

a loan to the defendant Magic Valley Properties, an Idaho
partnership.

(R. 200). However, at no time was Magic Valley

Properties served with a summons and complaint in this matter.
Instead, the only defendant before the court always has been and
continues to be defendant Leland Martineau.
2.

(R. 173).

The offsets and counterclaims of defendant Leland

Martineau consisted not only of accounting services rendered to
Michael Strand, his associated entities, and Magic Valley
Properties, but also for cash invested by Lee Martineau as a
partner.

(R. 421). It is Lee Martineau1s position that Michael

Strand is a partner and one-half owner of Magic Valley
Properties, and should therefore, reimburse Leland Martineau for
one-half of the amount of cash invested (R. 421).
ARGUMENT
I
LELAND MARTINEAU
PERSONAL JUDGMENT

DID

NOT

STIPULATE

TO

A

In its brief the plaintiff repeatedly makes the factual
assertion and legal conclusion that Leland Martineau stipulated
to personal judgment being entered against him, and that the
subsequent order is equivalent to a money judgment.

Neither is

supported by the record, and the defendant vehemently disputes

both.

This issue is at the core of this appeal and cannot be

resolved by a mere recitation couched in the tone of a
self-evident truth.
The first mention of the stipulation in the record is found
in the transcript of the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss dated
September 3, 1985 (Tr. beg. at R. 154) .

The applicable

discussion begins at line 18 on page 12.
MR. CAINE: Secondly, I think in a situation
we have in this case that there was an
attempt to foreclose on the mortgage, and if
— if counsel for Mr. Martineau is now saying
in this proceeding and are willing to
stipulate that, in fact, there is a $327,000
debt, that's evidence — even though there's
not a promissory note, there is a debt that
is secured by that note — or secured by that
mortgage, excuse me, and willing to stipulate
to that, that's fine. We'll stop right now
and go to Idaho.
MR. KIPP:
THE COURT:
case.

We accept it.
All right.

That settles the

MR. CAINE: You stipulate that that is
secured by that property?
MR. KIPP:
proffer.

We accept it.

THE COURT: All right.
we'll do then.
MR. CAINE:

We accept that

Well that's what

All right.

THE COURT: We'll stipulate there's a
$3 27,000 debt secured by the second mortgage.
That's plaintiff's Exhibit 1. And based upon
that, this case can be dismissed without
prejudice, and you can proceed up in the
state of Idaho. All right.
MR. CAINE:

All right.

After discussion about the allowability of attorneys1 fees, the
discussion as to a personal judgment against Mr. Martineau comes
up again on page 15 at line 6:
MR CAINE: My client places something here I
may be taking for granted. We're not —
we're not foreclosed from the possibility
when we bring this action, obviously against
— on the mortgage in Idaho from raising that
this is still a personal obligation to Mr.
Martineau? You're not making that kind of
determination?
MR. KIPP:
said.
MR. CAINE:

I don't understand what you just
Well I don't either.

THE COURT: Well, if that property — if you
foreclose on that property, I would think
they are allowed — if you foreclose, there's
a sale, there's a deficiency, you get a
deficieny [sic] judgment.
MR. KIPP: Deficiency. They'll have a
deficiency judgement against whomever are the
makers, I guess, the testators or signers of
the mortgage.
THE COURT: I would think so. I think Leland
Martineau, Charles Waters, Magic Valley
Properties —
MR. CAINE: That's it.
understanding.

That's our

(R. 165-169).
It is clear from this discourse that the parties did not
enter a stipulation that personal judgment be entered against Lee
Martineau but only recognized that there may be further judicial
proceedings against the signatories on the mortgage JLf the sale
of the property was insufficient to satisfy the debt.

Mr. Caine

himself recognized that the issue of Mr. Martineau's personal

liability was reserved and not precluded by the stipulation.

The

language establishes that the parties stipulated that the
mortgage was valid; that it secured a debt of $327,000; and that
Lee Martineau would not raise the lack of a promissory note as a
defense to foreclosure.

(A complete copy of the transcript of

the Hearing on the Motion to Dismiss on September 3, 1985, is
included in the Addendum as Exhibit " A " ) .
The Minute Entry on the stipulation is consistent with this
verbal stipulation reached in open court and is instructive for
what it does not say.

Pursuant to its terms, the court ordered

that:
1. this case is hereby dismissed
without prejudice;
2.
court;

the parties may proceed in the Idaho

3.

no fees are allowed as to this case.

(R. 41). Nothing in this Minute Entry suggests the judgment was
to be entered against Lee Martineau with a stay of execution
pending foreclosure.

The basis for this omission is the simple

fact that Lee Martineau did not stipulate to such a judgment.
copy of the Minute Entry is included in the Addendum as Exhibit
"B") .
This interpretation is further supported by the Joint
Affidavit of Carman E. Kipp and William W. Barrett, counsel of
record at the time the parties entered the stipulation.

In

describing the stipulation, Mr. Kipp and Mr. Barrett stated:

4

(A

4. That as a result of the discussion,
a stipulation was reached to the effect that
a lawful mortgage existed that would be
subject to foreclosure which proceeding would
necessarily take place in Idaho as to the
subject property and that the proceeds of the
sale of the property would be applied to the
balance which the mortgage secured.
5. That at no time was there ever any
consideration of a judgment being entered nor
was this contemplated in or covered by the
stipulation.
6. That the document entitled 'Order
and Judgment1 dated October 11, 1985, signed
by the Honorable Scott Daniels, District
Court Judge, while it is entitled 'Order and
Judgment' is in fact an order consistent with
the record and the stipulation which are
before the court and which are identified and
discribed [sic] in this affidavit.
7. That the issues as to whether there
would be a deficiency after application of
the foreclosure proceeds, and as to whether
Martineau was owed accounting and other fees
by Strand, were not addressed and were
reserved in the said Order.
(R. 350-351).

(A copy of the Affidavit is included in the

Addendum as Exhibit " C " ) .
The confusion which the plaintiff seeks to use to its
advantage only arises later when the order prepared by Mr. Caine
was entered.

It has no indication that it was mailed to Mr. Kipp

for his approval pursuant to the rules.

Plaintiff relies on

Paragraph 3 of that Order to argue that personal judgment was
entered against Lee Martineau.

Paragraph 3 states:

3. That pursuant to Section 78-37-1
U.C.A. (as amended in 1953), that plaintiff
are required to foreclose said mortgage
against the property which is located in
Cassia County, State of Idaho, before
R

proceeding against the personal assets of the
defendant Martineau.
(R. 51). If this paragraph is interpreted in a manner consistent
with the oral stipulation reached by the parties in open court
and on the record and in a manner consistent with the Minute
Entry, then it can only grant plaintiff leave to proceed against
Lee Martineau for a deficiency judgment after the Idaho property
is sold.

Even by its own terms, it does not say that plaintiff

is awarded a personal judgment against Lee Martineau, execution
of which is stayed pending foreclosure.
Finally, it must be pointed out that there are no findings
of fact made by the lower court as a basis for amending the Order
and treating it as a personal judgment.

Instead, the Minute

Entry and Order simply state that plaintiff's motion to amend the
judgment is granted.

Because there are disputed issues of fact,

it was error not to make findings upon which to base the order.
(R. 338, R. 380) .
Based on the foregoing, the defendant objects to the
plaintiff's remarks in its Statement of Facts implying that Lee
Martineau acted intentionally to violate the October 1985 Order,
especially the following two statements:
1.

"In the Idaho action, Martineau raised numerous defenses

in an attempt to defeat Judge Daniels' October 11, 19 85 Order and
Judgment."
2.

(See Respondent's Brief at page 10).

"More than two years after the entry of the Order and

Judgment, after Martineau had thwarted all attempts of Nupetco to

foreclose on the Idaho property and fulfill the terms of the
stipulation, Nupetco filed a Motion to Amend the Judgment to
relieve Nupetco of the obligation to foreclose the Idaho property
prior to pursuing Martineau on the judgment."

(See Respondent's

Brief at page 11) .
The ultimate, overriding issue in this case is whether there
is a legal and factual basis under which to impose personal
liability on Leland Martineau,

There is neither, and it was

error to grant plaintiff's motion.

The Order should be reversed

and the issue remanded.
II
LELAND MARTINEAU HAS BEEN DAMAGED BY THE
COURT'S FAILURE TO SET ASIDE THE ORIGINAL
ORDER AND JUDGMENT IN THIS MATTER ON THE
BASIS THAT STRAND AND MLK WERE NOT THE REAL
PARTIES IN INTEREST
The plaintiff argues that there was no abuse of discretion
in the Court's failure to set aside the stipulation and Order and
Judgment of October, 1985 on the basis that Strand and MLK were
not the real parties in interest.
The plaintiff first suggests that the substitution of
Nupetco on April 26, 1989, somehow cures the fact that Strand and
MLK had assigned the mortgage which was the subject matter of
this suit to Nupetco on April 23, 1983—over three months prior
to the filing of the complaint on August 2, 1983.

Although

plaintiff argues that Leland Martineau had notice of the
assignment prior to entering the stipulation, Lee Martineau
denies this allegation.

Instead, he learned of the assignment

when Nupetco filed to foreclose on the real property in Idaho
pursuant to the October order.
In addition, the sheer number of assignments in this matter
by Strand and MLK to Nupetco must be noted.

The mortgage which

is the subject of this action was assigned on April 23, 1983 (R.
66).

On both August 12, 1985 (R. 489) and October 7, 1988 (R.

584), the plaintiffs Mike Strand and MLK assigned all of their
rights and claims in this lawsuit to Nupetco.

On October 18,

1985, the plaintiffs assigned the Order and Judgment to Nupetco
(R. 490). If we assume that the initial transfer in April of
1983 was effective, this action was prosecuted by a party who had
assigned both the mortgage and claim to a third party entity.

It

is curious to note that while plaintiff argues that it was not
error to allow Strand and MLK to proceed despite the assignment
to Nupetco, the plaintiff also argues (for the purposes of
precluding Lee Martineau1s offsets and counterclaims) that an
assignor may not utilize any claim that he has assigned for his
own benefit.

(See Brief of Nupetco pg. 37).

Lee Martineau was prejudiced by the failure of the real
party in interest to pursue this action in two ways.

First,

allowing Strand and MLK to assert the claims alleged in their
complaint after assignment but not allowing Lee Martineau to
assert his offsets and counterclaims because of his assignment to
the Hammons-Martineau Partnership is grossly inequitable.
stipulation itself reserved the issue of offsets and
counterclaims.

The

Second, Lee Martineau was denied the full knowledge
necessary to enter the stipulation at issue.

It is entirely

different to settle a case based on an oral contract between the
parties to an action and to settle a case on an oral contract
between one party and an assignee of the other.

This is

especially true where the oral contract is alleged to be secured
by a mortgage on real property which would simply be invalid
without a written note.

As set forth in the case of Shaw v.

Jeppson, 239 P.2d 745 (Utah 1952):
The reason the defendant has the right to
have a cause of action prosecuted by the real
party in interest is . . . [to] permit the
defendant to assert all defenses or
counterclaims against the real owner of the
cause.
Id. at 748.
Judgment has been entered against Lee Martineau without his
consent and without trial on the issues, and he has been
precluded from asserting his offsets and counterclaims which
would have the effect of negating almost the entire amount of
that judgment.

This is especially egregious in light of his

repeated efforts to have all parties and all issues consolidated
and joined so as to economically and finally resolve the entire
matter.
Ill
LELAND MARTINEAU IS ENTITLED TO ASSERT HIS
OFFSETS AND COUNTERCLAIMS EVEN THOUGH HE
ASSIGNED
THEM
TO
THE
HAMMONS-MARTINEAU
PARTNERSHIP
Finally, plaintiff argues that it was not error to grant
9

plaintiff's motion for summary judgment precluding Lee Martineau
from asserting his offsets and counterclaims based on his
assignment of them to the Hammons-Martineau Partnership•
This issue was first raised by the plaintiff on the morning
of trial on the offsets and counterclaims.

The parties agreed to

continue trial to allow each to submit memorandums on the issue
of Lee Martineaufs ability to assert his claims in light of his
assignment of those claims to the Hammons-Martineau Partnership.
The parties also agreed that the respective interests of the
parties and assignees would "not be assigned, transferred or in
any way altered."

Instead, they would "remain static and

identical from now down through trial."

(Transcript pg. 4

beginning on R. 697) .
In his memorandum, defendant Lee Martineau argued that,
although his claims were now assigned to a partnership, that
partnership had agreed and authorized him to assert those claims
in this action.

Because there was a stipulation not to disturb

the status quo, Lee Martineau asked for leave of court to obtain
such authorization.

The request was denied, and summary judgment

was entered against Lee Martineau.

He was thereby precluded from

asserting his offsets and counterclaims that each party had
originally agreed to reserve.
In support of the lower court's dismissal, plaintiff argues
on appeal that Lee Martineau does not own the offsets and claims.
Because they are now partnership assets, plaintiff argues

10

Martineau cannot assert them for his personal benefit.

To

support this position, the plaintiff cites the companion cases of
Moss v. Taylor, 273 P. 515 (Utah 1929) and Taylor v. Barker, 262
P. 266 (Utah 1927).

However, plaintiff misinterprets Barker, and

Moss is distinguishable.

Under the facts of these companion

cases, Mr. Waddoups and Mr. Taylor were in an automobile
accident.

Thereafter Waddoups assigned to his passenger, Grace

Moss, any claim for damages to his car, and Moss brought suit
against Taylor.

However, in a separate and subsequent action,

Taylor brought suit against Waddoups in the City Court, and
judgment was entered for Taylor in that action.

Waddoups

appealed to the District Court and while trial de novo in that
court was pending, judgment was entered in favor of Moss in the
original action.

Thereafter, Waddoups sought to use the Moss

judgment to estop judgment in his case.

Therefore, although

Taylor v. Barker is cited by the plaintiff as supporting its
position on assignment, the issue in Taylor v. Barker was whether
there was an estoppel of judgment.

As the Supreme Court of Utah

itself stated:
The sole question to be determined,
therefore, is whether or not Ezra Waddoups is
relieved of liability to answer to the claim
made by H. L. Taylor for the alleged injury
to the Taylor automobile because of the
judgment secured by Grace A. Moss against
Taylor.
Id. at 262, 267.
It was on this issue that the writer of the opinion failed
to find authority for Waddoups1 position and not on the position
11

of offsets as claimed by plaintiff.

In addition, Moss v. Taylor

is inapplicable as in that case Waddoups assigned his assets to a
third person and private party.

In the case at bar, Leland

Martineau assigned his assets to an entity in which he has a 50%
ownership interest.

His use of those offsets and counterclaims

is consistent with the partnership purposes, and it is the intent
of the Hammons-Martineau Partnership that Lee Martineau be
allowed to exercise control over these partnership assets and
claim them in this matter.
On appeal, plaintiff also argues that Lee Martineau is
precluded from asserting the offsets due to a lack of mutuality
of obligation and on the basis that at least one of the claims
arose after assignment by plaintiff of all claims to Nupetco.
As an initial matter, defendant wonders which assignment
plaintiff seeks to use to establish this defense —
August 1983; October 1985 or October 1988?

April 1983;

Plaintiff's argument

that defendant cannot assert claims which are subsequent to the
pleadings is directly contradicted by Rule 13(d) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

That Section states:

(d) Counterclaim maturing or acquired after
pleading. A claim which either matured or
was acquired by the pleader after serving his
pleading may, with the permission of the
court, be presented as a counterclaim by
supplemental pleading.
As to plaintiff's argument as to mutuality of obligation, it
is, quite frankly, irrelevant.

Defendant Lee Martineau has

authority from the partnership to assert the claims at issue,

including the Hammons judgment against Michael Strand•

At all

times there was mutuality of the offsets and counterclaims
between the original parties, and plaintiff never raised this
issue prior to the assignment to the partnership.

In fact,

plaintiff admits that the assignment to Nupetco was made subject
to these claims and offsets.

The assignment to the

Hammons-Martineau Partnership does not negate this.
Finally, plaintiff also argues defendant cannot assert
amounts owing to Martineau & Company on the basis that this
entity is also a partnership.

The plaintiff is simply in error,

because Martineau & Company was originally a sole proprietorship
of Leland Martineau.

After he sold a 10% interest in the profits

of the business to a business associate, he retained full
ownership of all assets, including accounts receivable (R. 509).
Therefore, the lower court erred in precluding Leland
Martineau from asserting his counterclaims and offsets or from
joining all parties together in this action to resolve all issues
in a judiciously expedient manner in the face of defendant's
repeated requests to do so (See for example the Motion to
Consolidate R. 343 and Affidavit of John C. Green R. 318)

At the

very least, the foregoing creates material issues of fact
precluding summary judgment.

Therefore, the Order granting

plaintiff's motion and precluding the offsets and counterclaims
should be reversed, and the issues remanded for trial on the
merits.

CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in failing to set aside the Order and
Judgment of October 11, 1985 on the basis that Mike Strand and
MLK were not the real parties in interest; in granting
plaintiff's motion for Summary Judgment to allow plaintiff to
treat that Order as a personal judgment against Leland Martineau;
and in granting plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment to
preclude Leland Martineau from asserting his offsets and
counterclaims.

Each of these rulings should be reversed and the

case remanded for a full trial on the issues.
Respectfully submitted this^g7^>

day of March, 1990.
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

We're proceeding in the case of

Michael W. Strand and MLK Investments verses f'artineau,
4

| C-83-56S0.
I believe the first order of business is your

5
6

motion, Mr. Barrett?
MP. EPJRRETT: Your Honor, \;e brought this before yoii

7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

this morning and discussed it briefly.

Ihe position that i/ejve

taken with respect to this matter is that we recognize the
$100,000.00 at issue as to what the purpose and what the
intent of that particular money was for and to be used
for and hope it was what was to be received
for that.

and returned

There f s a balance owing for $327,989.25.
THE COURT:

Plus interest.

MR. BARRETT: Plus interest.

JLr.d if the second

16

mortgage, which was Plaintiff f s Exhibit Y.o.

17

now before the court is the security for that amount of

18

money under what has been termed by cur Supreme Court,

19

the single action statute and that would be Section 78-37-1

20

of the Utah Code and it's -- and the following statute Section

21

78-37-2, this statute in essence says, and I think you

22

probably had the opportunity to read it, there can be--

23

quote, "There can be

1, which is

one action for the recovery of any

24

debt or the enforcement of any rights secured solely by

25

mortgage upon real estate, which action must be in

1
2

accordance with the provisions of this chapter.11
In essence what this statute provides is that

3

if you have a mortgage, that mortgage must be foreclosed,

4

sold at a Sheriff's Sale. Then in the event there is a

5

deficiency, that deficiency can be included as a judgement

6

against the mortgage.

7

In this situation Mr. Stcsnc ':as not chosen

8

to foreclose on this second mortgage.

9

he has alleged is a debt.

He sued on what

And it's our position that he

10

just can't do that under some single action statute.

11

he has to first foreclose and be awarded a foreclosure

12

judgement, and the property then must be sold.

13

if there's a deficiency, he can go after Mr. Martineau

14

or I suppose, any of the other people who may have an

15

interest in the partnership for that deficiency.

16

That

And then

I gave you a copy of one case which was Bank

17

of Ephraim verses Davis.

18

older case, but the net effect is that this single action

19

statute has been around for a lone, long time.

20

in Bank of Ephraim case cites a case as I recall that

21

decided back in 1098.

22

I found another case which is an

In fact,
was

This other case that I have, which is First

23

National Bank of Coalville verses Bowling, was an action

24

where foreclosure action was filed by the First National

25

Bank of Coalville and the defendants failed to answer the

1

complaint, and so the clerk entered a default judgement.

2

The mortgagor then filed a motion to quash a

3

writ of attachment that had been issued subsequent to the

4

entry of the default judgement.

5

court denied the motion to quash the writ of attachment,

6

so writ of certiorari was requested of the Supreme Court.

7

They took jurisdiction and reviewed the case.

And the court, the lower

They cite

8 I the predecessors cf 78-37-1 and 78-27-2 :;hich are sections
9

104-55-1 and 104-55-2 of the revised statutes of Utah 1933

10

to compare the language. The language is essentially the

11

same.

12

It's been unchanged.
I think when they recodified, they changed the

13

numbering system, but the statute as fa:: as the language

14

contained therein, has not been changed.

15

The court in taking a lcck at these two statutes

16

that I refer to, you know, under Title 78 say this, and I

17

quote, " We have held that under these sections, there is

18

no personal liability by the mortgager until after foreclosu:}

19

sale of the security.

20

remaining unpaid and that mortgagee may not have a personal

21

judgement against the mortgagor until the security has

22

first been exhausted"--" it has been first exhausted." I added

23

an extra- word there.

24
25

And then and enly for the deficiency

And I think that's the position we're takinq
here.

There is no way that I'r. Strand is entitled to a

1

personal judgement against Mr. Martineau on this three

2

hundred thousand dollar plus • until he forecloses on that

3

second mortgage and until that property is sold.

4

if there's a deficiency, he'll have a judgement against him

5

personally for the deficiency.

6

And then

The Bank of Ephraim case essentially says the sam^

7

thing.

8

prayed for, at least the difference between the hundred

9

thousand and the three hundred thirtv-seven thousand should

And it's our position that based on that, the amount

10

be dismissed.

11

on th at basis.

He should not. be entit.led to pursue his claim

12

THE COURT:

Can 2 see the exhibit, the second one?j

13

KR. CAINE:

It's number 1.

14

THE COURT:

What about the> hundred thousand dollars,

15

what' s your position on it?

16

MR. BARRETT
j
: I thi.nk the hu ndred thousand dollars,

17

Your Honor, is in dis pute.

18

position is that was an investment.

19

made a partner in Maa ic Val].ey Proper•ties and he was also

20

giveri stock in Tagic Valley Motors.

21

r
rnone^

We don't —

2Ir. Martineau f s

Mr. Strand was then

So that was investment

m

22

We <don't d eny that there were subsequent monies

excess of a h undred thousand dollars, and I think

23

made in

24

that' s the money we're talking about in the second mortgage.

25

THE COURT:

Well

r

but if ]: believe your client,

6

I

1

and I believe it was an investment, then he doesn't owe the

2

hundred thousand dollars to Mr. Strand, right?

3

I1R. BARRETT: That f s right.

4

THE COURT:

If I believe Mr. Strand's position

5

that it was a loan, then he owes it.

6

even though he owes it,

7

the security.

8

action? is that right?

9

That's right.

But your position is

he can't get it until he's exhaustecj

So you're moving to dismiss the entire

KR. BARRETT: If you are willing to buy that, Your

10

Honor, yes, I think as we have discussed in chambers before,

11

we recognize that we have a problem, at least as to the

12

$100,000.00 because there are factual issues there.

13

As far as any subsequent leans that were made,

14

I don't think we're disputing that.

15

disputing the amount alleged in the complaint.

16

obviously, if you were to believe that the hundred thousand

17

was a loan, then this case is over.

18

there are some problems with respect to that hundred

19

thousand, and you want to hear more evidence, then at least

20

as to that, I don't think you can do anythinq.

21

I den't think we're
And

And if you believe that,

But I think as far as the balance owing —

I

22

suppose the dilemma

you are faced with is that you can either

23

rule now and throw

24

approach, or you can take this under advisement, hear the

25

evidence on the hundred thousand collars and make your

the whole thing cut if you choose that

1

decision based on that

2
3

THE COURT:

How could I possibly

consistently

j throw out the three hundred twenty seven dollar lawsuit

4

saying they have to exhaust their security first without

5

I also dismissing the hundred thousand dollars? I don't see

6

how I can consistently because a diversion cf the facts

7

wouldn't lend itself to that result, it seems to me

8

MR. KIPP:

Your Honor, J t\ink that aoes a little

9

beyond what the briefing was done, and I apoloqize for also

10

speaking, but that part of it I think is in my area of this

11

case.

12

a matter of law on whatever amount is covered by the mortgag^

13

if the hundred is not covered by the mortgage, they can't

14

beat us on the hundred because it ! s an investment that we

15

don't owe him.

And the ansvTer is we think we 1 re entitled to win as

I think

16 j

THE COURT:

17

MR. KIPP:

18

THE CGURT:

19

MR. KIPP:

20

—
That's

I think that's what you said
Yeah.
Either it's a loan, the whole thing

is a loan, in which you handle by the government of the

21 | law which he says here on ic or it's not a loan and
22

' therefore not a lien, the hundred

23 I

THE COURT:

Okay. Mr. Caine

24

MR. CAIi:C:

The court now has the document in

25

front of it that I'll be referrino. to

1
2

If it please the court, I have a number of, I
suppose, responses to this,

I think,that needs to be said.

3

Number one, I think first of all to some extent

4

it addresses the timeliness of bringing this motion on the

5

day of the trial.

6

years; the complaint as Mr. Kipp indicated, a little

7

earlier when we talked about some additional checking

8

found has not been amended in any way, form and the

9

allegations have not changed.

10

This matter has been pending for two

And so then on the morning of the trial, we

11

now have the defendant coming forward claiming "V7ell, you

12

didn't foreclose the mortgage, so you're birred."

13

court needs a little bit of background as to what has gone

14

on in this case before you can make a decision.

15

I think the

I will make a proffer of some testimony that I

16

have.

17

Lake City, is here to give, if we need to, and that W:S

18

these parties did, in fact, initiate a lawsuit to foreclose

19

this second mortgage in the State of Idaho prior to this

20

suit being initiated here.

21

upon, really, a sipulation of all the parties wherein it

22

was determined that under Idaho law, this second mortgage

23

in fact really isn't a mortgage because there's no underlying

24

note and could not be foreclosed.

25

Dan Jackson, who is an attorney at law here in Salt

That suit was dismissed based

The court obviously understands that to

f o r e c l o s e — s o the court is clear, the property we're talking
1
about foreclosing is in Burley, Cassia County, Idaho.
2
3
4

So foreclosure against real property couldn't lye here*
It would have to go as an action in rem.
So they tried to clo that.

The case was dismissed

5
up there on the basis in effect that all the parties recognised
6
7

that under Idaho 3 aw, this mortgage was defective because
there's no underlying note.

Also, it may very well be defective

8
on its face under our lrw or any other lav; when you have
9
a comment saying "This is to secure indebtedness between
10
the parties in varying amounts in eiccess of $200,000.00."
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

It's not clear lo

me whether that's a sum certain and can

obviously be attacked in our own jurisdiction.
So there's some question to the validity of this
mortgage to begin with, And I submit \:e have not plead
either the validity or invalidity of this document as a
mortgage in this case, but very simply produced this as a
piece of evidence indicating, if ycu v;ill- as an

admission

against interest, against Mr. Kartineau, that the debt we're
talking about here is a loan. Just like T.;e > ave introduced
checks which have the word "loan" en them.

Just like

we introduced other documentation in Mr. Martineau's own
handwriting which indicate a loan.

That's part of the case

23
24
25

demonstrating a lean.
Under that extent, this is not being treated

10

1

as a mortgage per se, but is evidence indicating an

2

admission against the interest he has in this case or his

3

claim, at least, that this, that this is simply an invest-

4

ment.

5

In addition, the case that's been quoted here,

6

and I think the court needs to carefully look at that

7

Ephraim verses Davis, is distinguishable

8

its face, but I think the basic proposition here is correct,

9

and I don't dispute that.

to some extent on

This is a case where counsel for the bank went

10
11

in on a prejudgement sort of a situation before he had done

12

anything, before he foreclosed against the security and

13

before he filed a suit against the individuals, personally

14

attempted to attach personal property of the defendant on

15

the basis that it was about to be removed and all that sort

16

of thing.

17

The court is familiar with hew that is done.
Then there was a motion to quash that prejudgement

18

writ of attachment.

The court in the Supreme Court said

19

it should have been quashed in effect because they didn't

20

go ahead and foreclose against the mortgage, saying in

21

effect that 78-37-1, which is the mortgage

22

rule in this state, really goes to the issue of where you

23

go to get satisfaction and where ycu go if there is a valid

24

mortgage;

25

secured by the mortgage, the real estate before you look to

fcreclosure

is that you, in fact, must sell the securities

11

1

a deficiency,

2

So you really are talking in this case about

3

judgement types of remedies.

4

no argument with the fact that if, in fact, we got a judgemerj

5

in this case against Mr. Martineau or foregone his interest

6

in this property up there, the first thing we'd have to do

7

is go up and try to foreclose against that property based

8

upon a judgement here before we could eye after his

9

personal assets.

10

we have to do --

11

And I have no —

and I have

And I think that's exactly what this case--]

THE COURT:

You think you can get a personal judcr^

12

ment against someone even though there's a mortgage, so

13

long as you don't execute on the judgement until you fore-

14

close the mortgage?

15

MR. CAINE:

Yes.

17

THE COURT:

That's not --

18

M R . CAINE:

Secondly, I think in a situation

16

Secondly

I think t^at case allows that.

—

19

we have in this case that there was an attempt to foreclose

20

on the mortgage, and if —

21

now saying in this proceeding and are willing to stipulate

22

that, in fact, there is a $327,000.00 debt, that's evidence--]

23

even though there's not a promissory note, there is a debt

24

that is secured by that note -~ or secured by tihat mortgage,

25

excuse me, and willing to stipulate to that, that's fine.

if counsel fcr Mr. Martineau is

12

1

W e 1 1 1 stop right now anc go up to Idaho.

2

MR. KIPP:

3

THE COURT:

All right.

4

MR. CAINE:

You stipulate that that is secured

5

W e accept i t .
That settles the case.

by that property?
W e accept it. Ve accept that proffer.

6

MR. KIPP:

7

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. CAINE:

All right.

TI-:? COURT:

We'll stipulate there's a $327,000.00

3

W e l l , that's what we'll

do then.

9 I
10
11

debt secured by the second mortgage.

12

Exhibit 1. And based upon that, this case can be dismissed

13

without prejudice, and you can proceed up i-i the state of

14I Idaho.

That's Plaintiff's

All right.

15

MR. CAINE:

16

MR- KIPP:

All right.
Your ^onor, I should be sure that

17

we're clear about some of the sideline stuff of that.

18

don't have their complaint before m e .

19

and I must say, I don't share counsel's view about

20

that this becomes unimportant at this point.

21

scught attorney fees.

22 J f e e s h e r e .

I

In Idaho the complaint]

In Idaho they

I think they dc not seel: attorney

I f t h e y d o , t h e y a r e n o t e n t i t l e d t o tliera.

23

MR. CAINE:

24 I

MR. KIPP:

Well

«

And they ought to be clea"; ^-i the

25 I r e c o r d .
13

MR, CAINE:

1

Let me clarify one thing for the court]

2

Obviously, our —

3

total claim in this case is $427,000.00 and I understand—

4
5

we're not chanqing our position tnat the

MR. KIPP:

I understand that reserves $100,000.00

dispute.
MR. CAINE:

6

Okay.

if they are willing to

7

stipulate that there's not going to be an issue in Idaho,

8

that there's no underlying note, and that the mortgage doesn1

9

secure a debt and that the amount they are willing to

10

stipulate to is $327,000.00, okay.
THE COURT:

11
12

It seems to me the question of

attorney fees is something you are talking about in Idaho.

13

MR. KIPP:

Yes.

I just don't want attorney fees

14

granted here.

15

nothing in this record, nor is there anything before the

16

court that empowers them to collect attorney fees in this

17

dispute.

18

whatever the lav; up there

That's not part of our stipulation.

There's

I don't know what the Idaho law about foreclosure—[
—

19

MR. CAINE:

It allows for attorney fees.

20

THE COURT:

Right.

As to this case, C-83-5680,

21

it will be dismissed without prejudice, no attorney fees

22

awarded; is that right?

23

MR. CAINE:

24

MR. KIPP:

25

MR. CAINE:

That's what I think he said.
That's correct.
Okay.
14

1

THE COURT:

All right.

Then you'll prepare an

2

Order to that effect?

3

MR. CAINE:

Yes, I will.

4

TilE COURT:

Submit it to Mr . Kipp for approval

5

pursuant to Rule 2.9?

6

MR. CAINE:

My client places something here
We're not -- we 1 re not fcre-

7

I may be taking for granted.

8

closed from the possibility when we bring this action,

9

obviously against —

on the mortgage in Idaho from raising

10

that this is still a personal obligation to Mr. Martineau?

11

You're not making that kind of determination?

12
13

"ft. KIPP:

I don't understand what you just

said.

14

MR. CAINE: Well, I don't either.

15

THE COURT:

Well, if that property —

if you

16

foreclose on that property, I would think they are a l l o w e d —

17

if you foreclose, there's a sale, there's a deficiency, you

18

get a deficier.y judgement.

19

MR. KIPP:

Deficiency.

They'll have a deficiency

20

judgement against whomever are the makers, I guess, the

21

testators or signers of the mortgage.

22
23

THE COURT:

I would

think so.

I think Leland

Martineau, Charles Waters, Magic Valley Properties --

24

MR. CAirE:

25

MR. KIPP:

That's it.

That's our understanding.

The rights that those give to them

15

as against parties exist, it's available, the mortgage, the
amount which is agreed,subject to provisions of Idaho
law, they can proceed to foreclosure.
MP. CAINE:

All right.

I'll di aw the Order, then,

THE COURT:

Thank you.

Court will be in recess.

(Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.)
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10

all of the testimony and proceedings had, and caused said

11
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12

pages constitute a full, true, and correct report of the

13

same.

14
15

DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 16th day of
September, 1985.

16
17
18

MX^r^v.

19

Susan S. Sprouse, CSR/RPR

V

-

>POSUL^U^D

20
21

My Cpmmission Expires:

22

rovember 19 85

23
24
25

17

County of Salt Lake - State of Utah

FILMED
TITLE:

FILE NO.
COUNSEL:

{y PARTIES PRESENT)

^/TlAOhrkJiL

^-f^-S^gO

(• COUNSEL PRESENT)

J QnstJi

(/) >d&rt3uuyl
O^

rx\<Jft

£ asa

CLERK

^ . jdfiAfi7<L4i^

-r-

L

r>//—//fa/CTZ.ts&tj.

HON.

REPORTER

-7

¥^fi-

^/sfr

AjuLuJi^
JUDGE

4-$,/?&*•

DATE.

S^o>

(\lf)\nti u%
U n(IA«<
hh tnh,

hifiKMcttd.

Arf t L >0o)t ^ ^ o

<f
rt/^A

jj
0
/t */'*<? A M

*«* r+>d /u.

T//i. > xi/A

ir

SKTT^

/] •
<j. OhJ x^ As?

fi/mn( /-< fs s\o

Q<j.0 fccfifi aoj fries*?/.

WKidAxil

u) jjffaqsyrd

,/o

vWi<2\.t.)

0<rd

Lt^/rn/.JLicf

fln

%JQ ti?/rrd

£u/r>if^~

it MJLtivu A

r —

f

j jflw?

0(1 Kit—Jn.

«>j ^iJo rnh-ij />, wYYiy

aphmwd

3\^rr> J J LA r/hp nflrrujLjd. ,A&4t

"•
uii^i/v
\LLJS

T

V. r

yfrto/tt (?M>\-/$^
Oa^e

i-swIIOI I

B

PAQE^ / OF

Z

S?A

CARMAN E. KIPP A1829
WILLIAM W. BARRETT

-STN^a-- j^^c^s/^

KIPP ANO CHRISTIAN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
CITY C E N T R E
175

EAST 4 0 0

I.

#330
SOUTH

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8<4lll-23l«*
(SOI) 5 2 1 - 3 7 7 3

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL W. STRAND and MLK
INVESTMENTS, a Partnership,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
LELAND A. MARTINEAU,
CHARLES WATERS, MAGIC
VALLEY MOTORS, INC.,
and MAGIC VALLEY
PROPERTIIES, a Partnership,

JOINT AFFIDAVIT OF
CARMAN E. KIPP & WILLIAM
W. BARRETT
Civil NO.: C83-5680
Judge Scott Daniels

Defendants.

Affiants being first duly sworn, depose and say:
1.

That they were counsel of record for Leland A.

Martineau prior to and at the time of the hearing in this cause
on September 3, 1985.

i-AHIBIT—C-

nno*ms

2.

That they were not counsel for any of the other

parties and that that fact was disclosed of record and to the
Court.
3.
testimony

That after the presentation of the evidence and

by plaintiff, the Court entertained

a Motion made

on behalf of defendant Martineau by affiant William W. Barrett
during the course of which discussion ensued as reflected by
the attached transcript.
4.

That as a result of the discussion, a stipulation

was reached to the effect that a lawful mortgage existed that
would

be

necessarily

subject
take

to

place

foreclosure

which

proceeding

would

in Idaho as to the subject property

and that the proceeds of the sale of the property would be
applied to the balance which the mortgage secured.
5.

That at no time was there ever any consideration

of a judgment being entered nor was this contemplated in or
covered by the stipulation.
6.

That the document entitled

n

Order and Judgmentn

dated October 11, 1985, signed by the Honorable Scott Daniels,
District Court Judge, while it is entitled "Order and Judgment"

3

-2P AND CHRISTIAN PC

A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW
CITY C E N T R E I , # 3 0 0
173 E A S T 4 0 0 S O U T H
S A L T L A K E CITY,
U T A H 8<4ill-23l4

(SOI) 521 3773

is

in

fact

an

Order

consistent

with

the

record

and

the

stipulation which are before the Court and which are identified
and discribed in this affidavit.
7.
a

That

deficiency

the

after

issues as to whether there would be

application

of

the foreclosure proceeds,

and as to whether Martineau was owed accounting and other fees
by Strand, were not addressed and were reserved in the said
Order.
Further affiants sayth not^/
KIPPAND CHRISTIAN*,.&,

William W. Barrett
STATE OF UTAH
SS

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of
November, 1987.
C/3^

Notary Public
Residing at Weber County, Utah
My Commission Expires:
11/29/90
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